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It is ironic that the most suggestive and influential contribution of the past decade 
to the historiograpw of the late 19th century Transvaal has been that of an 
Australian filibuster who made a lightning sortie into the territory and then 
retreated into silence. Geoffrey Blainey, author of a series of books on Australian 
mining history, wrote a lone article on the Jameson Raid (l), which ended the lone 
standing preoccupation with the degree of Joseph Chamberlainls complicity in the plot 
to overthrow Kmqprls government (2) and seriously challenged the political 
interpretation of the origins of the Raid then prevailing. 
Blaineyts point of departure was the participation of only part of the Rand 
mining industry in the conspiracy, something which had puzzled previous interpreters 
who had explained it a w w  in terms of the national ties of the various firms and of 
historic animosity between certain magnates. Sceptical of "this subtle assumption 
that emotion and ideology more than economics dictated the behaviour of most mine- 
ownerst1 ( 3 ) ,  Blainey applied his knowledge of Australian mining practice to the 
problem and discovered what he felt was a far more significant basis for participation 
or non-participation in the conspiracy, that of the conflicting economic interests of 
the rebels and of thelloyalistslarising out of their respective control of deep-level 
mines or of mines along the outcrop of the main reef. Critical differences in the 
working conditions and capital requirements of these variants of mining, government 
policies that exacerbated these differences, and an acute mining and financial crisis 
in late 1895 that made the differences intolerable, are the material out of which 
Blainey constructs an economic interpretation of the Raid. 
Starting operations in the 18808, the outcrop companies worked the reef 
close to the surface where comparatively little effort and expenditure were needed 
to reach the gold-bearing ore. This meant quick profits which could then be used to 
finance the further development of the mine. By contrast, the deep-levels on which 
work began only in the mid-1890s, required an initial capital investment on a scale 
unprecedented in mining history, and years of costly shaft-sinking, before the reef 
was struck at depth and gold extracted. By late 1895, the deep-levels were in the 
midst of their expensive and risky spending programme. Most of the outcrops, on the 
other hand, were operating profitably, some exceedingly so. 
These natural differences were compounded by State policies that threatened 
the viability of the already vulnerable deep-levels, while leaving the well established 
and profitable outcrop mines relatively unscathed. The exorbitant prices charged by 
the dynamite monopoly, with Emgerls approval, fell more heavily on the deeps as they 
broke rock that was harder on average than that mined in the outcrops. The scarcity, 
high cost and inefficiency of black labour troubled all mining companies in 1894 and 
1895, as did the lack of State action to remedy this. The deep-levels were more 
threatened by the unsatisfactoriness of the labom supply, though, because of their 
dependence on the maintenance of a high level of production to cover their considerable 
overhead costs and to make profits. The cost of coal to fuel the engines of the 
mines was multiplied by the extortionate tariff charged by the rai1wa;y concessionaire 
appointed by the government, and this particularly handicapped the heaviest consumers 
of energy, the deep-levels which hauled up men and ore and pumped water from great 
depths. 
In addition to these extra burdens on their working costs, the deep-levels 
were also discriminated against in the administration of the gold law. The system of 
mining taxation it provided took very little from the rich outcrops, those concerns 
most able to underwrite the expenses of government, leaving the struggling deep-levels 
to pay heavy indirect taxes they could ill afford. For historic reasons, many of the 
outcrop companies, unlike their deep-level counterparts, held their properties under 
State mining-leases which stipulated the payment either of a nominal 
annual rental of acres) or of 29? of the value of the yearts 
gold output, which in the case of a producing outcrop would have meant a vastly greater 
sum. The gold law left the choice to the discretion of the government. Until late 
1898 Bwger was content to accept the token fee. 
A final and very serious complaint against the government was its indecision 
over the bewaarplaatsen. These were slivers of ground south of the outcrop mines which 
had been used as dumping-sites for their tailings before it was realized that the main 
reef series continued at depths at which mining was feasible beyond the boundaries of 
the outcrops. With the commencement of deep-level development, the hitherto valueless 
bewaarplaatsen became dangerous intrusions in the heart of the deep-level properties 
which threatened their rational and economical development. The government's reluctance 
to hand the bewaarplaatsen over to the only parties who could mine them and the distinct 
possibility that these wedges would be awarded instead to IOmger's friends, who could 
then hold the deep-level companies to ransom, cast a pall over the future of deep-level 
mining. 
The already shaky prospects of the deep-levels were dealt a potentially 
decisive double blow in the last months of 1895. The collapse of a year-long boom in 
South African mining shares "probably created crisis within the inner circles" (3a) of 
Rand Mines and of the Consolidated Gold Fields of South Africa, the chief deep-level 
companies. Most of their profits during 1895 had come from speculation on a buoyant 
share-market and from the sale of surplus mining claims at inflated prices. The 
evaporation of Eluropean investor confidence now removed their major source of present 
income. The slump also provoked strong doubts about the possibility of obtaining the 
large amounts of capital the deep-level programme still required. Their chances of 
doing so were further reduced by the news in November 1895 that the pioneer deep-level, 
the Geldenhuis Deep, which had recently entered the actual production stage, was 
working at a loss. !!The bell-wether of the deep mines, its initial failure shook the 
deep-level capitalists. They argued that the mine itself was not failing; it was the 
economic environment of Ktmgerls land that had failed." (4) The Raid was their attempt 
to correct this. 
This theory has stimulated a radical reinterpretation of the politics of the 
adjacent Reconstruction period (5) and has also suggested fresh insights into the 
conquest of Rhodesia. (6) It has also drawn a critical broadside which has knocked 
great holes in it. (7) Blaineyls critics challenged the primary distinction upon which 
Blainey had built his whole argument, that between deep-level and outcrop firms. An 
analysis of the patterns of control and the distribution of profits of the outcrops 
showed that, in addition to its heavy investment in deep-level mining, the firm of 
Wernher Beit, to which a number of the conspirators belonged, had retained vast 
outcrop holdings which considerably exceeded those of any other Rand firm. Of the 79 
main reef outcrop mines which had produced gold between 1887 and mid-1895, only 10 were 
held by Wernher Beit, but these had produced 32h of the total gold output and paid 45% 
of the total dividends distributed during this period. (8) Thus the chief beneficiary 
of any favour Ktmger might have shown the outcrops was in fact sirdtaneously the 
largest deep-level firm. The critics1 conclusion that the boundary between deep-level 
and outcrop ownership was blusred needs some qualification. It does not particularly 
apply to the other major member of the conspiracy, the Gold Fields Company, which had 
made use of the share market boom of 1894/5 to liquidate its outcrop holdings. The 
only exception to this was its acquisition of the Simmer and Jack company in 1894, but 
this failing outcrop was needed to facilitate the firm's deep-level plans in that area 
of the reef. The proceeds of the outcrop realizations were reinvested in deep-level 
development, and by late 1895 Rhodes's firm had become the classic deep-level company 
of Blainey's theory. As regards Wernher Beit, its deep-levels were of greater 
strategic importance to it than its outcrops. The deeps were relied upon to provide 
the firm's profits long after its outcrops were worked out. This might have made the 
firm more sensitive to governmental policies discriminating against the deep-levels 
than would otherwise have been expected from a firm with such extensive outcrop 
interests. 
It is also argued that not all the advantages lay with the outcrops. (9) 
The deep-levels had learnt from the costly mistakes made during the early years on the 
Rand, owing to the unique character of its deposits and the lack of relevant mining 
experience on the part of the original promoters. Thus the outcrops began with 
inadequate machinery and ill-planned installations which required expensive replacement 
during the 1890s. Mistakes were made in the underground lay-out of the mines which 
could not be altered. The deep-levels were suitably equipped from the start by some of 
the best mining engineers of the age. As the first to work the main reef, the outcrops 
bore the main costs of its exploration, much money being wasted on attempts at working 
badly faulted, impoverished, and even barren, ground. With the advantage of this hard- 
won experience, the deep-levels were able to avoid many of these expensive geological 
pitfalls and to choose the most promising ground. (10) Wernher Beit and the Gold Fields 
took care to site their projects to the south of the most successful outcrops on the 
theory, subsequently profitably vindicated, that the value of the reef close to the 
surface was a reliable guide to the character and value of the same section of reef at 
depth. Finally, the greater cost of sinking and equipping a deep mine was compensated 
for by working a much larger claim area with a bigger mill than that of the average 
outcrop, thus achieving important economies of scale. 
Blaineyls analysis of the special burdens State policy placed on the working 
costs of the deep-levels has gone largely undisputed, but his claims about the effects 
of the gold law are misconceived. He is correct in arguing that a number of highly 
profitable outcrops largely escaped direct taxation throug2-1 the State's lenient 
application of the mijnpacht royalty system. This was not, however, a source of 
grievance to the deep-level firms, as he suggests. The interpenetration of deep-level 
and outcrop capital meant that Wemher Beit, for example, were taxed £50 aanually on 
a mijnpacht covering nearly all of the gold-bearing area of its Robinson mine, which 
had paid £1,225,337 of the £5,589,286 distributed by the 42 mines which had paid 
dividends between 1887 and June 1895. (11) The alternative form of mining taxation, 
the monthly licence of 20/- per claim, was barely felt by super-mines like Wernher 
Beit's Geldenhuis Deep, which spent £343,000 between the formation of the company and 
the start of production in late 1895 on developing and equipping the 218 claim 
property. (12) The mijnpacht/claim distinction was of little relevance for tax purposes 
till the Boer government decided in late 1898 to enforce the 29/0 royalty on the output 
of mijnpachts and to impose a 5% tax on the profits of the mining of claims. The real 
significance of the mijnpacht before this lay in its role as the linchpin of a system 
of gold law that guaranteed the leading mining capitalists a monopoly of the best 
mining land. Wernher Beit and the Gold Fields were to make very successful use of 
this device a few years after tne Jameson Raid. (13) 
The bewaarplaatsen question was a major source of anxiety to the industry in 
1895 as it involved the disposal of mining rights worth millions of pounds. During 
the year the industry had come close to a settlement in its favour only to have this 
snatched away by Kruger in a late intervention which left the bewaarplaatsen question 
in a dangerous state of suspension at the end of 1895. Some important progress had 
been made,thoq&', during the year. Nearly 2/5 of the area in dispute had once been 
held by the outcrop companies under mining licences which had long since lapsed. With 
a swiftness remarkable in a bureaucracy renowned for its tardiness, and without the 
consultation with Kruger and Leyds required by law, C. J. Joubert, the Minister of 
Mines, who was financially beholden to the Ramllords (14), J. L. van der Merwe, the 
Mining Commissioner of Johannesburg, one of an important group of lfprogressivefl 
officials who shared the pro-industry stance of the progressive party in the Volksraad, 
and the Assistant Mining Commissioner, F. Smits, later to join the Gold Fields as the 
firm's negotiator with government, rushed through the renewal of the long since expired 
licences, thus handing the magnates the mining rights to a large part of the 
bewaarplaatsen, much to the fury of the Etmger party in the Volksraad. (15) The 
bewaarplaatsen that remained in the balance were a source of grievance not only to the 
deep-level companies, as Blainey maintains, but to the outcrops as well. When the 
issue had first arisen in 1892, the mining industry had collectively decided that the 
I 
holders of the surface rights on the bewaarplaatsen, that is the outcrop companies, had 
a preferential claim to the undermining ri&ts. This had the full support of Wernher 
Beit for the usual reason, the overlap in the control of deep-levels and outcrops. 
While the bewaarplaatsen were needed for the rational exploitation of the firm's deep- ~ level holdings, they could also contribute significantly to the asset-value of the I 
firm's outcrop holdings. , 
The mining aYLd financial crisis of the last months of 1895, which Blainey 
represents as the proximate cause of the revolt, does not seem to have had the special 
significance for the deep-level firms that Blainey's hypothesis requires. On the 
contrary, Wervlber Beit and. the Gold Fields were much less vulnerable to the market l 
collapse than the chief outcrop firms that took no part in the conspiracy. (16) Wernher 
Beit was the most financially sophisticated and secure of the Rand houses in 1895. In 
Rand. Mines, formed in 1893 to develop the deep-level. area the firm had previously 
assembled, it had created the prototype of the group system which in the 20th century 
was to become the financial mainstay of the South African mining industry. This vehicle l 
brought together successfully the needs of professional investor and of mining company. 
It was of sufficient size and strength to guarantee the systematic provision of capital l 
to a series of planned operating subsidiaries, while at the same time this spread of I 
investments insured it against the failure of any one mine. The security this offered 
made Rand Mines sufficiently attractive to Euro ean financiers to insulate it from the 
vagaries of the stock market. During the 1894A gold -h, the firm did not share the 
popular delusion (characteristic of all stock market booms) that prices would continue 
l 
to rise indefinitely (l7), and was aware of the disproportion between the intrinsic I 
and market values of most Rand stocks. (18) Consequently, it had avoided the small 
investors1 futile piling-up of paper profits a d  concentrated instead on the winnowing 
of its investment portfolio through the lucrative disposal of "rubbish" to the less 
percipient. (19) Contrary to Blainey, Wernher Beit emerged from the market d6b%cle 
of late 1895 somewhat strengthened and with its lines of communication to European 
capital intact. 
The Gold Fields company had no illusions either about the permanence of the 
boom. "There cannot be the slightest doubt that any rapid increase of prices, such as 
we have seen lately, must be followed by a more or less severe re-action ...", wrote 
Rudd, the joint managing director with Rhodes of the Gold Fields. (20) Prompt advantage 
was taken of the rising market to cash in the companyfs interesBin outcrop ventures 
and the Chartered Stock with which Rhodes had lwnbered the Gold Fields during the 
euphoric early days of Rhodesian mining. The enormous profits from these realizations, 
together with large sums raised thro- the issue of debentures and preference shares 
in 1894, meant that G d d  Fields was well placed in late 1895 to pursue its deep-level 
strategy despite the down-turn in the stock market. 
By contrast, J. B. Robinson and Barney Barnato coaman.ded financial sand- 
castles in late 1895. Prior to the boom each, unlike Wernher Beit, had depended on a 
narrow outcrop base for most of his firm's cash-flow. Thus Robinson was excessively 
reliant on a single mine, the Umglaagte Estate m d  Gold Mining Compamy, while only 
three of Barnatot S were still producing dividends in 1895. (21) In addition, each held 
a large number of indifferent, unproven or low-grade properties. (22) When the boom 
cane, this dross was turned into gold. Dubious companies were floated and worthless 
paper printed at a rate which eventually outstripped public demand and glutted the 
market. The culminating effort of each was the creation of an eponymous bank, for 
which the Economist felt "a better word than ?banking! might have been found to 
describe The lgbanksv were "blind pools9"24) into which each placed a list 
of unspecified assets and which were then floated at exorbitant capitalizations of £2 millions in Basllato" case (25) and £3 millions in Robinsonls. (26) Barnatot S 
timing was unfortunate. Just as the shares were offered to the public, the market 
sagged. His vain efforts to shore it up to save the bank scheme cost him the profits 
of his earlier jobbing. Robinson survived the crash with his winnings intact, but 
with his reputation as a successful company promoter, previously his chief financial 
asset, badly shaken. 
The contrast Blaineyfs critics draw between the financial stability of the 
conspirators1 firms and the instability of the non-conspiratorsf is too stark. The 
finances of the deep-level houses, particularly of the Gold Fields, need to be seen 
in the context of their overall requirements and objectives. As Wernher Beit had 
gained a virtual monopoly of the deep-level ground immediately south of the best 
outcrop mines, Gold Fields, as a late xta.rter, had to content itself' with the deep 
levels of Wernher Beit's deep levels. While their geological prospects were brigkt 
and their exploitation presented no special mining problems, these second row deeps 
did require even greater capital sums than Wernher Beit's first row mines and would 
have even longer lead-tines before there was any return on the investment. The 
considerable fixads accumulated by the Gold Fields in l894 and 1895 fell well short of 
the total that would eventually be needed, and were not available in large part for 
deep-level development, for, competing with the publicly proclaimed mining programme 
for the finite resources of the firm, was the Gold Fields barely concealed private 
objective of providing Cecil Rhodes with the means of pursuing his broader ambitions. 
Thus the company paid away large swns in dividends in 1894/5 and 1895/6, despite the 
managementls awareness that the "profits" during these financial years came mainly 
from the once-off realization of assets and that more concrete profits would only be 
available for distribution in a few years time, when the deep-levels came into full 
production. (27) The financial unorthodoxy of this policy of paying dividends out of 
capital (needed for development) is highlighted when it is compared with the more 
conservative approach of Rand mines, which was much stronger financially but only 
paid its maiden dividend in December 1898 after nearly all its deep-levels had been 
brought to the production stage and were self-supporting. (28) 
The other half of Blaineyfs deep-level crisis of late 1895 was the failure 
of the pioneer deep-level mine to work at a profit. The Geldenhuis Deep was, in fact, 
in serious difficulty during its early months of production, the long-awaited first 
crushings of deep-level ore yielding disappointingly small quantities of gold, 
shaking popular confidence in the future of this ty-pe of mining. While these poor 
results were a matter of considerable concern to Rand Mines, the operators of the mine, 
the neanagement, unlike the public, remained confident of the venturefs progpects, 
attributing its problems to the normal difficulties of starting any big mine. (29) 
Johannesburg wrote to the London principals that "the results will not look so bad to 
those who understand something. about mining". (30) It seem that, relying on this 
professional judgement, Wernher Beit took advantage of the deep-level scare to buy 
back cheaply shares dumped by the public on news of the bad crushings. (31) The 
firm's confidence was vindicated by the "exceptionally high" profits of the mine from 
1897 onwards. (32) 
l 
To clinch their counter-argument aimed at restoring a political interpretation 
I of the origins of the Raid, Blaineyk critics attempt to minimize the possible financial 1 
I bplications of the leadership of the conspiracy by key figures in the mining industry. 
l Alfred Beit is reduced to a small supporting role and the Gold Fields Company dissociated from its revolutionary co-founder. "It was Rhodes, a director of the ( company in name only, who had, behind the backs of its London managers, the real 
I developers of its capital structure, plunged it into subversive politics. l1 (33) Rhodes, 
it is claimed, was absorbed with his Cape and Rhodesian concerns and took little 
interest in the operations of his Transvaal company; this was reflected in his failure 
to attend a single annual meeting of the Gold Fields during the 15 years in which he 
was associated with it. (34) He was seriously at odds in 1895 with those in the Gold 
Fields who were most involved in its management and most concerned with its financial 
well-being, particularly with Rudd, the CO-founder,who protested in March 1895 that 
he was no longer prepared to work with Rhodes. (35) The managerial faction was not 
party to the conspiracy (36) and was bitterly disapproving when it was revealed. (37) 
This version of Rhodes's relationship with the Gold Fields is unsatisfactory. Wherever 
Rhodes's personal. preferences lay, Johmesbwg was critically important to him 
financially. It provided the asset-base and large income upon which his outside 
schemes depended. Consequently, the prospects of the Rand mining industry could not 
be regarded with indifference. His interest and participation in its management were 
hardly "minimal". (38) While he was not involved in the company's day-to-day 
administration, he took a full part in strategic decisions such as the switch from 
outcrops to deep-levels . (39) He conducted high-level d n i n g  negotiations on behalf 
of the Gold Fields with the principals of other Rand firms. (40) He chose key 
personnel, such as John Hws Hammond, who was to plan and supervise the development 
of the firm's properties, and his brother Ernest who, it was arranged, would relieve 
Rudd as far as possible of active management and would take full charge of the 
Johannesburg office. (41) In late 1895, Cecil substituted brother Frank, formerly a 
colonel in the Royal Dragoons, who was eminently unqualified as a director of mining 
companies (42) (and of military operations, as the fiasco in Johannesburg at the end 
of the year was to reveal). This appointment to high office in the firm over the 
strong objections of Rudd (43), the joint managing director, together with the ease 
with which Rhodes propelled the company into the conspiracy, demonstrate how closely 
identified the Gold Fields remained with Cecil Rhodes on the eve of the Raid. 
Besides Rhodes, Alfred Beit was the only conspirator of fimt magnitude 
importance in the mining constellation. Just as Frank Rhodes, Hammond and Jameson 
were satellites of Cecil Rhodes, so all the other conspirators, excepting the Imperial 
officials, were either Beit's employees or his clients. Lionel Phillips, for all his 
stature as President of the Chamber of Mines, as Chairman of Rand Mines and as the 
first citizen of Johannesburg, was nevertheless dependent on Beit's grace and favour 
for the maintenance of his position. However important Percy Fitzpatrick might have 
become in the months before the Boer War, at this time he was simply a functionary who 
was co-opted into the conspiracy in its final stages. Charles Leonard, leader of the 
Transvaal National Union, was solicitor to Beit's companies on the Rand, and George 
Farrar, another late initiate, had supplied them with mining machinery, while Beit's 
firm was the chief underwriter of Farrarls East Rand venture. Because Beit (with 
%odes) is clearly at the centre of gravity of the conspiracy, his motives are a vital 
clue to its character and causes. His participation presents Blaineyls critics, 
however, with something of a conundrum. As he was a German, it is unlikely that Beit 
joined the conspiracy to further Britain's imperial interests. Since Blainey's critics 
rejected the deep-level hypothesis, Beit could not be allowed economic motives either. 
This meant falling back on a rather unsatisfactory psychological interpretation. 
"Perhaps the explanation lies in the relationship which had evolved between Beit and 
Rhodes since their first encounter on the Kimberley diamond fields. Rhodes had become 
dependent on Beit for financial advice and aid.... In return it would appear the 
diffident Beit derived a sense of status and satisfaction from his association with the 
assertive imperial schemer. (44) Without disputing Rhodes 1s and Beit' S long-term 
business and personal association,it seemAnevertheless unlikely, in view of Beit's 
very skilful and highly successful pursuit of his financial self-interest over the 
years, whether in Kimberly, on the Iland or in Rhodesia, that he so forgot himself in 
1895 that he joined the conspiracy without first fully considering its economic 
implications and the possible financial advantages it offered his firm. The probability 
that Beit's actions (and hence those of all his subordinates) were governed largely by 
economic considerations constitutes a very good prima facie case for a renewed search 
for an economic explanation of the Raid. 
While Blainey 1 S' extended argument that economic necessity drove the Rand' S 
deep-level companies to rebellion in 1895 has effectively been dismantled, his basic 
technique of exploring the contrasting economic interests of the firms that joined the 
conspiracy a d  those that did not might still provide the best means of uncovering the 
I1lost causes" of the Raid. 
In the years before the Boer War, the firm of Wernher Beit achieved a position 
of power in the mining industry matched only by that of Anglo-American since. Thm7-h 
a combination of financial and organizational skills, good fortune and financial muscle 
(early success in Kimberley and Continental connections), the firm had acquired by the 
early 1890s a large stable of successful outcrops. These provided the base for the 
next stage of the firm's growth, its expansion into deep-level development. With the 
security its substantial resources gave it, it could risk a heavy investment in the 
theory that the main reef series continued beyond the southern boundaries of the 
outcrop at depths and at gold values that permitted profitable mining. Encompassing 
an area of mining ground nearly equal to that of all the outcrop companies of the 
Central Rand combined (45), the Rand Mines project, publicly launched in 1893, 
committed Wernher Beit to bringing to production over a period of years a series of 
operating subsidiaries that would be producing large quantities of gold long after the 
adjoining outcrops were exhausted. 
The Gold Fields shared this lien on the long-term future of the Rand. Until 
late 1894 the company was an untidy patchwork of mining interests reflecting its 
uneven course since its foundation in 1887. The company still held the remnants of 
its abortive ventures on the Rand in the mid-180s. Through bad judgement and ill- 
fortune the founders had selected the least promising of the many outcrop possibilities 
available in the early days, including a large area of barren ground. This failure had 
encouraged the diversion of funds into diamond-mining and Rhodesian development, and in 
mid-1894 the Gold Fields still held 165,000 Chartered shares, £78,000 of Chartered 
debentures, and 20,000 De Beers. (46) The lack-lustre perfomce of these investments, 
plus fresh opportunities on the Rand, had prompted the recapitalization of the company 
in 1892 and the switching of its attention to the Transvaal once more. It had acqpired 
undeveloped deep-level ground plus a range of minority shareholdings in outcrop,deep- 
level a.nd land companies controlled by other firms. It did little mining itself and 
was flmainly a huge share trust companyw. (47) This changed with the upsurge of bl?e 
prices in late 1894 which stimulated the rationalization of the firmls interests a.nd 
its conversion to a more active mining policy. The London management sold quickly and 
heavily, fearing a swift reaction, (48) The problem was now how best to reinvest the 
proceeds. It made no sense to buy back outcrops standing at market capitalizations 
out of all proportion to their relatively short remaining productive lives. It was far 
preferable to use the gains to expand the firmls deep-level interests and to begin the 
development of a new generation of mines, (49) Once the firm was committed to such a 
p r o m m e ,  it was logical to realize the remainder o f  the firm's outcrop shares and 
its other marginal interests. It also seemed advisable to seek an alliance with 
W e d e r  Beit and thus avoid costly competition. Agreement was reached in November 
1894, which envisaged the joint purchase and development of property even further 
sputh then the deep-level mines currently planned. (50) 
George Farrarfs East Rand project matched those of Wernher Beit and the Gold 
Fields in boldness of conception. The East Rand Proprietary Mine was formed in 1893 
to attempt the systematic development of a four-mile stretch of the outcrop hitherto 
avoided because of doubts about the payability of the ore and because of difficulties 
in tracing the badly disturbed reef. Good progress had been made by the outbreak of 
the Boer War. (51) 
The Barnato and Robinson firms rivalled the Rand Mines and Gold Fields in 
popular esteem in 1895, but ran a very different sort of business. Barnato and 
Robinson were more concerned with milking the present boom than with preparing for 
future mining development. To attract, the investing public they set up schemes which 
superficially resembled those of Wernher Beit and the Gold Fields, but were in fact 
simply means of jobbing shares. During the late 1880s Robinson had acquired a large 
tract of land on the western fringe of the Witwatersrand, some miles from the central 
portion where the reef had p ~ v e d  payable and where mining was concentrated before the 
Boer War. Until shortly before this conflict, little had been discovered about the 
gold-mining prospects of a property which insiders considered "problematicallf. (52) 
Nevertheless, in 1894/5, Randf ontein Estates , the proprietary company in which 
ownership of the undeveloped and largely unexplored ground was vested, floated 5 
operating subsidiaries, each with a large share capital. Very little of the money 
subscribed seems to have gone into the equipment of these mines (53), all but one of 
which performed dismally till the discovery of a new and payable reef at Randfontein 
in 1898. While Robinson counterfeited the Rand Mines' group system, Barnato simulated 
its deep-level programme. Responding to popular demand for this class of share, he 
formed the Barnato Consolidated Nines in July 1895, into which he placed an odd 
assortment of deep-level claims. These holdings differed in critical and revealing 
respects from those of the genuine deep-level ventures. Rand Mines and Gold Fields 
deeps were placed south of successful outcrops to maximize their chances of striking 
rich ore. m of Barnatofs claims were south of struggling or unproven outcrops. (54) 
The Gold Fields and Rand Mines held extended tracts of deep-level ground that could be 
sub-divided into compact units of sufficiently large size to sustain deep-level mining 
with its high initial costs. Much of Barnatols holdings were in unviable, dispersed 
pockets. 
Neither of the principal German f i m  was involved in any large-scale 
development programme in 1895. Both Adolf Goerz, who had come to the Rand in the 
late 1880s as the representative of the Deutsche Bank, and George Albu, who had 
arrived soon after and was closely linked with another of the large German universal 
banks, the Dresdener, had specialized in the takeover aYld revitalization of existing 
mines that were foundering. (55) In 1895 each ventured conservative amounts of 
capital on a haradiuP of deep-level projects (56), but these were of much less 
consequence to the firms than their older ventures. 
The chief difference between firms inside and those outside the conspiracy 
was that the former were committed by 1895 to long-range mining programmes while the 
latter were either preoccupied with stock-jobbing or were content with modest holding 
operations. This meant that the conspirators stood to gain far more over the long 
, 
term than the rest from the replacement of a self-willed and frequently obstructive 
Boer government by one more easily manipulated by the mining industry, The Beit, 
1 
Rhodes stnd Farrar fisrns would be the prime beneficiaries of the radical changes that 
could then be effected in the cost of dynamite, coal and labour, which wolnld 
significantly increase profit margins over the decades of operation of their large- 
scale projects. The establishment of a captive government in the Transvaal could also 
be eqected to enhance the credit-rating of Rand mining on the intermational. capital 
market, which would make it possible to raise funds on easier terms than in the past. 
This offered major savings in the financing of Gold Fields' second row deeps and its 
joint deep-deep ventures with Wernher Beit, for which enormous sums of capital would 
still have to be raised. Significant reductions in working costs and in financial 
charges would in turn gceatly enhance the value of the conspirators' deep-level assets. 
The chance of multiplying the a1read;y considerable profits their projects promised could 
well have had an irresistible appeal to Rhodes, an inveterate gambler, as his career 
shows, and to Beit, whose more cautious partner complained of his llwildtl behaviour on 
the stock market. (51) Perhaps the Jameson Raid was not the last throw of the 
despairing but, instead, a bold bid by the audacious. 
----ooo------ 
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